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It is easy to hear or read a metaphor and identify it as such. It is 
harder to say just what a metaphor does or how it does it. Metaphor 
departs from the standard use of a word or words to express some 
other meaning that typical prosaic language could not achieve. 
Perhaps it is this ability to communicate meaning beyond the scope 
of ordinary usages of words that makes the use of metaphor so 
popular. Whatever the source of its popularity, as an unconven­
tional, yet highly effective semiotic device, we might begin to won­
der about its origins. How is it that language, with its ability to 
convey meaning through its arbitrary sounds and relationships, can 
break its ownrules to convey even more meaning? Is there (1) a more 
fundamental relationship between things in the world on which this 
stretching of the structure of language relies or (2) does metaphor 
achieve its higher meaning through a fabrication that is just as 
arbitrary as the vocalized sounds which make up language? 
Aristotle's theory of metaphor affirms the former in order to 
understand how language can break its own rules and still convoy 
more meaning. Aristotle's realist theory of metaphor helps us an­
swer some difficult questions about how metaphor functions since it 
prescribes some limits to the subjects that may be properly used in a 
, metaphor. For Aristotle, there is some essential similarity between 
the actual objects compared which serves as the basis for a successful 
metaphor. One of the key differences between a good and bad 
metaphor is the selection of fitting terms. Aristotle says that the 
ability to create metaphors is IIa sign of genius, since a good 
metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in 
dissimilars" (P1459a).1 But just how this functioning of'genius' takes 
place is left out of Aristotle's description. 
Aristotle's theory of metaphor commits him to at least the mini~ 
mal claim that objects actually contain properties since metaphor is 
supposed to utilize similarities actually found in the objects that are 
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compared to each other. Thomas Reid's realism is similar in that he 
believes that objects really possess the characteristics which some 
philosophers (he thinks) are too quick to relegate to the realm of mere 
sensations. In order to explain the gap between our sensations and 
our awareness of material bodies, Reid theorizes that (as Derose 
says) "sensations 'naturally suggest' or are 'natural signs' for the 
qualities of bodies" (322). As a result of the realism which Aristotle 
and Reid share, we can use Reid's theory of natural signs to give a 
plausible account of the workings of, and problems related to, 
Aristotle's idea of genius. 
We begin by exploring how Aristotle's theory of metaphor 
commits him to the type of realism I have attributed to him. For 
Aristotle, "[m]etaphor consists in giving the thing a name that 
belongs to something else" (P 1457b). The nature of this relationship 
seems a bit oversimplified. This definition seems to allow for the 
giving of anything the name that belongs to any other thing. It is clear 
from Aristotle's formalism towards the creation of metaphors as 
expounded in the Rhetoric, however, that Aristotle does not think 
metaphor creation is so open ended: II [m]etaphors ... mustbefitting, 
which means that they must fairly correspond to the thing signified" 
(R1405a). There are a few ways a metaphor may be"amiss" (R1405a) 
but the most crucial of these ways is the failure to pick subjects of 
metaphor which are similar in some essential way. 
Aristotle also tells us that II [0]ne term may describe a thing more 
truly than another, may be more like it, and set it more intimately 
before our eyes" (R 1405b). It is clear from this statement that, for. 
Aristotle, there is such a thing as good and bad metaphor making. 
Already we can see that not just any word can be used metaphori­
cally with any other word for lithe want of harmony between two 
things is emphasized by their being placed side by side" (R1405a). 
Not only is the choice of terms determined by some internal similar­
ity, buttochoose incorrectly exposes the failure of the choice since the 
subjects of the metaphor are juxtaposed as a necessary part of the 
form of metaphor. 
The right or 'fitting' way to construct a metaphor requires "an 
intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars" (P 1459a). The 
similarity that a person with 'intuitive perception' (genius) can pick 
out is not an obvious or traditionally appreciated kind of similarity. 
If it were, the use of metaphor could be substituted by the standard 
employment of language in prosaic form but "[m]etaphor gives 
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style, clearness, charm, and distinction as nothing else can" and, 
unlike the ability to utilize and master ordinary speech, II [metaphor] 
is not a thing whose use can be taught by one man to another" (R 
1405a). This mastery of metaphor which cannot be taughtby another 
is the power of genius which Aristotle identifies in the Poetics. 
Similarity can manifest itself in many different ways. Words, for 
example, canhave similar sounding words, but Aristotle specifically 
has the hidden similarity of things in the real world (in 18th century 
terms, he has an anti-sensationalist view of the similarity of things 
compared with metaphor) in mind: "Metaphors must be drawn ... 
from things thatare related to the original thing, and yetnot obviously 
so related" (R 1412a, my emphasis). These 'original things' mostly 
include actual objects in the world which have specific, similar 
properties, but they can also include things like actions: in one of his 
examples of a fitting metaphor, Aristotle uses the substitution of the 
word "draw" for "sever" (P 1457b). 
It is not so crucial to note that Aristotle's theory of metaphor 
hinges on the use of similar objects in the real world. It is, however, 
very important to realize that the properties Aristotle believes make 
terms proper subjects for metaphors are independentof the term; the 
properties are a part of the term but only because the term points to 
something real (whether it be an object or an action or whatever) that 
actually has those characteristics. Metaphors are only as good as the 
similarities they point out between real things with real characteris­
tics, they do not simply"create similarity and resemblance" (Danesi 
323) out of two completely dissimilar things. 
It is clear that Aristotle's theory of metaphor is grounded on the 
real existence of things and the properties they possess. Further­
more, Aristotle says that the ability to construct metaphors is depen­
denton the ability to grasp hidden similarities in things that are 
otherwise (on the surface) completely dissimilar. But how can we 
make sense of this power of genius? It is the power of genius which 
makes a person able to create fitting metaphors. Genius is an ability 
to pick out similarities that are already in dissimilar things and put 
them into metaphorical form, though not everyone has this ability. 
Moreover, genius is not a thing that one person can teach another. 
Genius, then, must be a power that is either developed through 
specific types of life experience (independent of a human /I teacher") 
or one with which a person is born. Regardless oHhe cause of genius, 
the odd thing is that the experience of the power of metaphor is not 
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restricted to those with genius. In other words, although only those 
with genius can create metaphors, a great many more people can 
receive and appreciate metaphors. Once similarities in seemingly 
dissimilars are brought to their attention by the person with genius, 
these receivers can appreciate the subtle similarities in otherwise 
dissimilar things. If this were not the case, the power of metaphor 
would be severely restricted since it would only be useful to those 
with the power of genius in the first place. Indeed, it is hard to believe 
that Aristotle would claim that rhetoriticians "must pay careful 
attention to metaphor" (R 1405a) when "the technical study of 
rhetoric is concerned with the modes of persuasion" (R 1355a) and 
these 'modes of persuasion' must be "notions possessed by every­
body" (R 1355a) in order for rhetoric to effectively persuade. 
Now that it is clear that even those without genius can appreciate 
the similarities made explicit through metaphor, a new question 
arises. We no longer need to know how the power of genius works, 
instead we need to understand how universal appreciation of meta­
phor can take place without universal possession of genius. One 
plausible explanation for the intelligibility of this state of affairs can 
be given using Reid's concept of natural signs. Before we can under­
stand how Reid's natural signs can explain Aristotle's porblematic 
theory ofmetaphor reception, it is important that we explore some of 
their characteristics. 
Reid defines natural signs in contradistinction to artificial signs. 
Artificial signs are thosewhich" [ arise] from some agreement among 
mankind" (LFA 29).2 Artificial signs are purely arbitrary signs which 
do signify, but only because they have been designated and learned 
by some group of people. Natural signs, on the other hand, "are 
understood by anyone, as smoke is universally understood to show 
that there is fire or as a sign of fire" (LFA 29). There are three types 
ofnatural signs which are distinguished by the manners inwhich the 
connection of sign to that which is signified is made apparent in 
humans. The connection of the first kind of natural sign to its obje~t 
is made through experience. The example of smoke being a natural 
sign of fire is an example of one such natural sign since, although the 
connection of the sign to the object is natural, it is only through 
experience that we can come to know this connection. The second 
type of natural sign is "not only established by nature but discovered 
to us by a natural principle, without reasoning or experience" (IHM 
44). An example of this type of natural sign is the facial expression 
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one makes when expressing a certain emotion. The ability to under­
stand these expressions is not gained by experience, but is a product 
of lithe constitution of human nature" (LFA 30). The third type of 
natural sign suggests things of which we "never before had any 
notion or conceptionll but give us grounds to "create a belief of 
[them]" (IHM44). I will focus on the second type of natural sign since 
it is "the foundation of the fine arts, or of taste" (IBM 45) and the 
understanding of metaphor falls under the category of taste. 
While exploring the notion of grandeur as an attribute of things 
which please taste, Reid makes it clear that "power, wisdom, and 
goodness, are properly the attributes of mind only. They are ascribed 
to the work figuratively, but are really inherent in the author" (EIP 
496). He asks the question: "ls there no real grandeur in material 
objects?/I (ErP 497). Reid asks this question because he seems to have 
gotten himself into trouble with one of his earlier claims-namely, 
that /I the object has its excellence from its own constitution, and not 
from ours" (EIP 495). 
In "Objectivity and Expression in Thomas Reid's Aesthetics/' 
Josefine Nauckhoff solves this seemingly devastating problem by 
explaining how attributes of mind may subsist in objects through the 
presence of natural ~igns (of the second type). Natural signs function 
as material significations of attributes of mind. Nauckhoff explains 
how uReid thinks we have direct access to the meaning of these signs. 
We do not need to interpret them in order to know what they 
express" (187). The truth of this statement lies in the fact that natural 
signs about which she is speaking fall under the second type of 
natural signs that 1/ are discovered to us by a natural principle, 
without reasoning or experience" (IBM 44). The upshot of our 
having direct access to this type of natural sign is that "we do not 
need to 'read' excellence 'into' a sign which naturally signifies an 
excellencei rather, the excellence is directly expressed by the sign" 
(Nauckhoff 187). Now it should be clear how the excellence is both 
in the object as expressed through natural signs as well as originally 
the '[attribute} of mind only.' 
It is important that natural signs do more than merely point to 
excellence since Reid presents a theory of metaphor based on their 
actual similarities: 
The various objects which nature presents to our view, even 
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those that are most different in kind, have innumerable 
similitudes, relations, and analogies, which we contemplate 
with pleasure, and which lead us naturally to borrow words 
and attributes from one object to express what belongs to 
another. The greatest part of every language under heaven is 
made up of words borrowed from one thing, and applied to 
something supposed to have some relation or analogy to 
their first signification. The attributes of body we ascribe to 
mind, and the attributes of mind to material objects (EIP 501). 
Just like Aristotle, Reid theorizes that metaphors are created as a 
result of "innumerable similitudes, relations, and analogies which 
we contemplate with pleasure." For Reid the creation of a metaphor 
takes place "by ascribing to [the objects of sense] intellectual qualities 
which have some analogy to those they really possess" (EIP 497, my 
emphasis). On Reid's account, creation of a metaphor means more 
than for Aristotle since a basis in objects of sense is a basis in natural 
signs. 
How does all of this help us with the problem of universal 
reception of metaphor in Aristotle's theory? Recall that Aristotle 
thinks that genius "implies an intuitive perception of tlle similarity 
in dissimilars" that"cannot be learnt from others." For Aristotle, 
those subjects that are capable of systematic study are rightly defined 
as arts. The man of art is thought to be wiser than the man of 
experience "because the former know [ s] the cause, but the latter 
do[ es] not" (M 981a). Because of the conceptual nature of an art, the 
artist IIcan teach, and therefore we think art more truly knowledge 
than experience is" (M 981b). Since the conceptual nature of art is the 
characteristic which makes art teachable, it follows that something 
that is notteachable must not be based on concepts.3 The importance 
of the unteachable nature of the power of genius is nowclear: genius 
is non-conceptual. 
The non-conceptual nature of the foundations of Aristotle's 
theory of metaphor is crucial to its relationship with Reid's natural 
signs of the second type. Recall that the reason these signs need no 
interpretation is because they are II discovered to us by a natural 
principle, without reasoning or experience." So we know tllat the 
natural signs on which metaphors are based are not the product of 
reasoning. Reasoning deals withconcepts, so wecan say that natural 
signs - Reid's basis for the reality of metaphor - are non-conceptuaL 
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Furthermore, ifwe substitute similarity of Reid's natural signs as the 
basis for metaphor for Aristotle's ambiguous II similarity in 
dissimilars," we get a non-conceptual basis for a non-conceptual 
process. The only thing left is to show how this relationship entails 
the possibility of universal appreciation of metaphors without uni­
versal possession of non-conceptual genius. Ifwe consider the other 
characteristic of the second type of natural signs-that they are not 
derived through experience-we must conclude, with Reid, that 
their connections must be made known "by some original principle" 
(LFA 30). This original principle is resolved by Reid "into the 
constitution of human nature" (LFA 30). Since the second type of 
natural sign must automatically be discovered by everyone since it 
is within the"constitution of human nature," the ability to compre­
hend similarities between natural signs and intellectual qualities in 
cleverly constructed metaphors must be available to all. 
It is true that "we find pleasure in discovering relations, simili­
tudes, analogies, and even contrasts that are not obvious to everyeye" 
(ElP 497, my emphasis), but this process of 'discovering' (which is 
not open to all) is different than the process of grasping similarities 
already brought out through metaphor (which must be open to all 
since the knowledge of how natural signs signify must be available 
to all people as a part of their human constitution). The diHCOVl..!ring 
process is an active one through which we /Iconned [similitudcli and 
analogies between things of very different nature] in our imaginaN 
tion and ascribe to one what properly belongs to the other" (Ell' 497). 
It is this activity which differentiates the two processes of metaphori­
cal cognition (discovery and reception) and makes it possible for 
Reid to claim that in one sense (the creative, active sense), the 
similarities are not open to all but in another sense (the receptive 
passive sense), since the similarities are based on the human consti­
tution, they must be open to all. 
The synthesis of Reid's theory of natural signs can fHI out some 
of the ambiguities of Aristotle's otherwise outstanding theory of 
metaphor. By pointing to similarities in Reid's natural signs as the 
source of correctly executed metaphor, we can moke sense or 
Aristotle's process of genius (as Reid's active process of imagina~ 
tion). Perhaps more importantly, we can resolve the difficulties 
arising from the restriction of metaphor to those with genius while 
the power of metaphor through comprehension remains available to 
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all. In the end, the combination of Aristotle's theory of metaphor with 
Reid's theory of natural signs gives us a solid explanation not only of 
how metaphor functions, but how this functioning is possible with 
a basis in the real properties that belong to actual things.4 
NOTES 
1 Citations from Aristotle are abbreviated as follows: P==Poetics, R=Rhetoric and 
M=Metaphysics. 
2 All citations from Reid are abbreviated as follows: LFA=Lectures on the Fine Arts 
in Thomas Reid's Lectures on the Fine Arts, EIP=Essays on the Intellectual Powers of 
Man in The Works afThomas Reid, vol. 1., and II-lM;: Inquiry into the Human Mind 
quoted from excerpts in Thomas Reid (page numbers given from Thomas Reid) 
3 Since All Conceptual things are Teachable things, the contrapositive of this 
statement, All non-Teachable things are non-Conceptual things, must be true. 
4 I wish to thank Josefine Nauckhoff and Marcus Hester for their helpful 
discussions about this paper. 
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